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Clavier: Perspectives on Sovereignty

CONTRASTING FRANCO-AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES ON SOVEREIGNTY

SOPHIE eLA VIER"

PART I
I.

INTRODUCTION

The findings of this paper augment Keohane's argument! that
sovereignty is a useful "conceptual lens" in the study of International
Relations and that understanding divergent conceptions of sovereignty in
Europe and in the United States is crucial to shedding light on the
formulation of their respective policies. Indeed, the first goal of this
paper is to expand on Keohane's premise and to address how France2 and
the United States understand sovereignty. The second goal is to argue
that the current conflicting perspectives on sovereignty displayed by
* Assistant Professor of International Relations, San Francisco State University. This paper
was presented at the Centennial Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(west) at Golden Gate University School of Law, in April 2006.
I.
Robert 0 Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States. in
Integration. in AN EXPANDING EUROPEAN UNION: REASSESSING THE fuNDAMENTALS 307-339 (lain
Begg, John Peterson & JHH Weiler, Eds., Blackwell Publishing 2003). Kehoane is the architect of
the so-called neoliberal instituionalism. His main argument is that sovereignty needs to be
"unbundled" and understood beyond its classical and unitary perspective.
2. While much of the argument pertains to Western Europe and not only to France, the choice
to focus on France sterns from both historical and recent events: Historically, France and the United
States have had intertwined political and philosophical foundations to the building of their
democracies, after WWII France became the key architect of the European construction. France is
also a permanent member of the Security Council and has vocally opposed the United States on the
issue of the conflict in Iraq. Finally, both the United States and France believe they have a special
moral role to play in the world.
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France and the United States are a departure from a historical pattern
whereby, at each key time period, challenges to the shared definition of
sovereignty and of the world order it symbolized, came from nondominant actors within or without the system in question. This paper
posits that we are currently witnessing contradictions amongst the
dominant actors. The third task of this article is to argue that the United
States' current position on sovereignty, its meaning and its function,
perpetuate a system that favors the use of force to resolve disputes. By
contrast, the "multi-perspective" sovereignty espoused by France within
the European context, could provide a new paradigm for a world order
guaranteed by international rule of law and not by the use or the threat of
the use of force. Finally, this paper concludes that these fundamental
differences go beyond an academic debate and carry with them
significant normative, economic, and political consequences that make
diplomatic confrontations between the two countries unavoidable.

II. RESTATING THE ISSUE
Central to a systematic review of the concept of sovereignty are the
following: first, the question of sovereignty, as it was made clear in the
Lotus case,3 is one of allocation of authority: who has jurisdiction over
what, and what are the mechanisms in place to protect this
allocation? Some of the mechanisms are composed of explicit rules and
more or less coercive methods of enforcement; other mechanisms are
internalized by society in a discrete value system shaping behavior as
well as explicit rules. It appears that at each key period of history, the
meanings assigned to sovereignty have embodied that the discrete value
element necessary to legitimize the explicit mechanisms put in place to
preserve the allocation of authority among the main actors in the system.
As such, sovereignty is concurrently both a normative concept and a
practice. In the words of Samantha Besson:
As a normative concept, the concept of sovereignty
expresses and incorporates one or many values that it
seeks to implement in practice and according to which
political situations should be evaluated [... J Concept
determination amounts therefore to more than a mere
description of the concept's core application criteria: it

3.

S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.l.J. (Ser. A) No. 10.
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implies an evaluation of a state of affairs on the basis of
sovereignty's incorporated values. 4

This statement is in agreement with Walker's position that:
sovereignty works by giving authority to definitions [ ... ],
the whole point of [modern] sovereignty is that it does
not exist and yet it has tremendous effects; it does not
exist and yet it is constantly enacted; it has no
foundations yet is always foundational. Whatever it is, it
is perhaps the strongest term in the modern political
world. 5

This point is adequately reenforced by Elshtain's statement that the
"development of the political notion of sovereignty has been
characterized as a process of ideology creation, the use of an abstract
theological structure to describe the temporal political structure."6 In that
sense, the contextual meaning of discourse is as relevant as the rules
themsel ves and, while the use of the term "sovereignty" has persisted,
the subjective values assigned to it have varied over time. Krassner
synthesizes this approach by asserting that "the meaning of sovereignty
and the actions that can be undertaken or directed by a sovereign are and
have always been, both contested and ambiguous."7
Of equal concern is that the allocation of authority, the mechanisms to
protect it, and the values assigned to sovereignty as a way to
conceptualize and legitimize it, belong to the dominant powers whose
survival is ensured by the system they themselves create. As a result, at
each distinctive era, there is fighting and rivalry for control - what is
fought for is more authority or even hegemony in the system. There is
no conflict over the system of meaning that sovereignty carries. Indeed,
until recently, sovereignty was what Paul Kahn calls a "club of victors."
Why is there no sovereignty for Quebec, Catalonia,
Scotland, Burgundy, or Provence?
Why is there
4.
Samantha Besson quoted in Dan Sarooshi, The Essential Contested Nature of the Concept
of Sovereignty: Implicationsfor the Exercise by International Organizations of Delegated Powers of
Government. 2S MICH. J. INT'L 1. 1107, IllS (2004).
S.
R.BJ. Walker, Peace in the Wake of Sovereign Subjectivities. in THINKING PEACE,
MAKING PEACE 26 (Barry Hindess & Margaret Jolly, Eds., Canberra: Academy of the Social
Sciences in Australia, 2(02).
6.
See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereign God. Sovereign State. Sovereign Self, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 13S5 (1991).
7.
Stephen D. Krassner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty. Shared Sovereignty and
International Law, 25 MICH. J.lNT'L L. 1075. (2004).
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sovereignty in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and a single Federal
Republic of Germany? Each question is answered by a
narrative of battles lost or of power successfully
asserted. s
Undeniably, the following historical review will assert that up until this
juncture, the dominant powers have been remarkably consistent in
forming an implicit consensus as to the subjective meaning they assigned
to sovereignty. Challenges to the meaning of sovereignty have, up until
the recent transatlantic alliance crisis, which is partly the object of this
paper, come from individuals within the system who were excluded from
decision making, or from forces outside the system.
III. HISTORICAL REVIEW
It is common in the literature on sovereignty to use the Peace of
Westphalia as a pivotal date for the study of modern politics. There is a
Eurocentric bias to this framework, especially taking into account many
other civilizations' considerations on sovereignty,9 but considering the
influence of Western ideology on international politics and law, it is a
necessary task indeed to concentrate on European history. It i~ always a
challenge to identify the appropriate starting point of a historical
overview. Within the context of a study on sovereignty in the European
space, it appears judicious to begin when sovereignty started to embody
an iron clad value system. 1O Thus, the Middle Ages seems the most
appropriate starting point when sovereignty was defined as God's
sovereignty.ll
Not surprisingly, the King of the Francs, Clovis'
conversion to Christianity and baptism in 496 is commonly accepted as
the onset of the Middle Ages in Western continental Europe!2 Clovis'
conversion gave him the support of the Church in his territorial
conquests and perpetuated the belief that he had a divine mandate. For
8.
Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty,4Q STAN. J.INT'L L. 263 (2004).
9.
See, for example, Native American concepts of sovereignty and how they differ from
European understandings in: Ron Gable, Sovereignty in the Blood: Cultural Resistance in the
Characters of James Welch, WICAZO SA REVIEW, Autumn 1993, at 37-43.
By contrast, the Greek ciIy states (which are often regarded as precursors of the modem
10.
nation-state system), envisioned sovereignty as the prerogative to exercise internal power and
engage in external relations on a equal footing, but not necessarily as a value. Similarly, the Roman
Empire was sovereign in its control over population and territories, not as a value, but as a
consequence of it military might.
11.
See Daniel Engster, DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN STATE POWER,
(Dekalb, Northern lllinois University Press 2(01).
12.
See Mortimer Chambers, Raymond Grew, David Herlihy, Theodore K. Rabb, Isser
Woloch, THE WESTERN EXPERIENCE, VOLUME I TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. (New York:
MacGraw Hill 1995).
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the reasons stated above, the pre - Westphalian era of the Middle Ages in
Western continental Europe will be the first period studied in this essay.
The second area of attention will be on the Westphalian era itself. For
each period, the paper will address the dominant powers or forces, the
value they assigned to sovereignty, the consequent justification of
allocation of authority, the mechanisms to protect this allocation, and the
mechanisms to reproduce or even expand the system, thus created.
Central to this review is the understanding that for both periods, the use
of force was necessary to protect the system of allocation of authority, as
well as to expand the boundaries of the system.
A.

THE PRE-WESTPHALIAN ORDER

Undoubtedly, the Church was the hegemonic power during the entire
Middle Ages. While a succession of strong leaders followed Clovis,
Most
none could rule without the support of the Church. 13
conspicuously, it was the Pope who crowned Charlemagne Emperor of
the Occident in 800. 14 Following Charlemagne's troubled succession and
the subsequent split of his empire in 843 by the Treaty of Verdun,15 his
grandsons could not effectively combat outside threats and their
authority was soon supplanted by various lords. These lords interacted
among themselves and with their vassals to form the framework of a
complex feudal system. In this framework of overlapping secular
jurisdictions, the concept of Church sovereignty remained unchallenged.
John Ruggie adequately describes medieval Europe as a "patchwork of
overlapping and incomplete rights of government," which was
"inextricably superimposed and tangled."16 The only true and exclusive
sovereignty was that of God and of his earthly representative, the Pope.
An abstract from the Dictus Papae of Gregory VII (1073-1085)
appropriately summarizes and confirms this assertion: l ?
1.

The Roman Church was created by God alone ....

2. Only the sovereign (italics added) pontiff is by law
called universal.. ..

13.
The 6th to the 10th century: a new Orientation for the Church, available at,
http://dlibrary.acu.edu.aulstaffhome/yukoszarycz/ecc/MOD4.HTML (last visited May 17, 2006).
14.
[d.
15.
Wikipedia: Treaty of Verdun, available at, http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilTreaty_oCVerdun.
16.
John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations 47 Int'l Org. 149-50 (l993).
17. C. Warren Hollister, Joe W. Leedom, Marc A. Meyer & David S. Spear, MEDIEVAL
EUROPE: A SHORT SOURCE BOOK 183-84 (New York: MacGraw Hill 1992).
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9. Only the pope's feet can the princes kiss ....
12. He can depose the emperor....
19. No one can judge him ....
These principles established the legal consequences of the belief in
God's sovereignty. Indeed, the allocation of authority provided for the
universal jurisdiction of the Pope, as well as his immunity from all other
jurisdictions, national or international. In that sense, while the feudal era
was one of overlapping jurisdictions of the secular powers and of the
Church, there was an unchallenged belief in the overall supremacy of the
Church's expression of God's sovereignty. IS
This belief system justified various enforcement mechanisms. First,
within the European space, the Church itself was active in the
suppression of dissent l9 and in spreading its doctrine through the
edification of churches and monasteries. More notably, cathedrals
offered the illiterate masses the benefit of a religious education through
sculptures, paintings, and stained glass which taught both testaments in
many visual representations. 20 Outside the European space, the Church
undertook to protect and/or expand its power through its struggle with
the Muslim world - first in the Middle East in a series of crusades
(starting in 1095), then much closer to home by reclaiming Spain by the
13 th century.21 Finally, especially by the end of the Middle Ages, the
universal, all embracing jurisdiction of the Pope took on a truly global or
even universal component by claiming jurisdiction over population and
territories worldwide (whether Christian or not).
The Treaty of
Tordesillas in 1494 justified the expansion of Europe outside of its
continental confines by conferring it the legitimization of a religious
mission. 22 Whether by crusades, as an expression of just war, or by
colonial expansion as a duty to Christianize, the use of force was a
legitimate tool of policy. lochnick and Normand capture the spirit of the
era when "[c]hivalric rules actually served to protect the lives and
property of privileged knights and nobles, entitling them to plunder and

Chambers et ai, supra note 12.
[d., at 266.
20.
See, for example, the description of the use of Wall paintings in teaching, available at
http://www.stmargaret-streatley.org.uklWallPaintings.htm.
21.
The Christian Crusades 1095-1291, available at,
http://www.gbgm-umc.orglumvlbiblelcrusades.stm.
22.
Treaty between Spain and Portugal concluded at Tordesillas; June 7, 1494, available at,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonlmodeur/modOOI.htm.
18.

19.
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kill peasant soldiers, non Christian enemies and civilians of all religions
and ethnicity."23
The profits generated by this social order caused a power struggle among
the dominant forces of the Middle Ages: the Pope (or the Church),
European monarchs, and powerful feudal lords. Noticeably absent was a
challenge to a concept that well served their need for mercantile wealth
and power that ensured their dominant positions in a, presumably
God-given, hierarchal, and unequal society (both at home and abroad).24
Challenges to this construction came from non-dominant forces,
individuals and/or units excluded from the decision-making power and
the benefits of the system. Essentially, the feudal organization gave
power to the Church and its clergy, and to the military (kings and lords).
Opposition came from outside of these two groups, and took the form of
a rebellion against the Church and the emergence of a powerful
non-religious and non-military class of merchants, artists, and
philosophers excluded from decision making.
The Church, fraught with corruption,25 became the object of its biggest
challenge to date to its doctrinal supremacy. Martin Luther6 proposed,
in a revolutionary approach, that the Church was no longer needed as an
intermediary between God and Man. Meanwhile, Calvin27 advocated
strict interpretation of the Scriptures, putting salvation in the hands of
God, not those of priests. Under their influence, the Protestant
movement was instrumental in weakening the Church in Western Europe
and the transformation of the world order that its previous strength had
justified.
In the meantime, the ruling order of the knights was also under attack

from a new class of people, as merchants grew in wealth and power
(often exceeding that of the nobility).28 At the same time, humanism in
both artistic and scientific expressions spread throughout Europe, the
23.
Chris Jochnick and Roger Nomand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of
the Laws of War, 35 HARV.INT'L L. J. 49, 61 (1994).
24.
Medieval Anguillara, A Study in Feudal Lordship, available at,
http://www.dicksonc.act.edu.aulShowcaselClioContents/chivalry/anguillara.html.
25.
After the great Plague, the Church capitalized on the fear of judgment day by selling
indulgences, in essence offering assurance of redemption in exchange for money. (See Chambers et
ai, supra note 12)
26.
Martin Luther, MARTIN LUTHER: SELECTIONS FROM HIS WRITINGS (John Dillenberger,
Ed., 1958).
27.
John Calvin, CALVIN ON GoD AND POLITICAL DUTY (John T. McNeil, Ed., Macmillen,
New York, 1950).
28.
Medieval Merchant Culture, available at,
http://www.brown.edulDepartmentslltalian_Studies/dweb/society/srtucture/mercahnt_cult.shtml~
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belief that men endowed with reason could understand and eventually
master everything. Both the merchant class and the humanists benefited
from each other through a well established system of patronage.
Humanist philosophers formulated a new theory of sovereignty. While
advocating different perspectives from each other, Hobbes, Bodin, and
Machiavelli all departed from the previous ideology of Church
sovereignty and advocated state sovereignty. In light of the chaos of
overlapping jurisdictions, they argued that any reliable government,
whether tyrannical (Hobbes), or Constitutional (Locke), or imposed
(Bodin)29 would be a better alternative than overlapping levels of
authority and Church corruption.
Finally, the end of the Middle Ages took place in the context of all of
these challenges and was precipitated by the religious wars and the
subsequent peace of Westphalia in 1648.30 New decision makers and
dominant powers emerged and with them, new definitions of sovereignty
and new mechanisms.
B.

THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER

The date of 1648 was as significant in launching state sovereignty as a
value as 496 had been in affirming God's sovereignty as a value. Indeed,
the Peace of Westphalia established the modern system of states, each
independent from each other, equal to each other, and recognizing no
supranational power, especially that of the Church. 3l God's sovereignty
was replaced by states' sovereignty, but the latter carried with it the same
sense of theological value: a hegemonic belief that states not only exist
as such, but that their sovereignty is the result of a universal norm that
"rested on foundations different but no less religious than those of the
medieval church."32 This is well summarized by Paul Kahn's statement
that:
the history of modern political evolution is in substantial
part a story of the growing autonomy of the sovereign
from the church but it wrong to think of that simply as a

29.
See Jean Bodin, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 15750 (M J Tooley, trans, Basil:
Blackwell 1955), Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN PART I AND II (1651) quoted in Brad Roth,
The EruJuring Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 Fla L. Rev. 1017, 1020-21, n.l2 (2004).
30.
Treaty of Westphalia; October 24, 14648, available at,
http://yale.edullawweb/avalon/westphal.htm.
31.
Sovereignty, available at, http://plato.stanford.edulentries/soverignty.
32.
Constantin Fasolt, Sovereignty aruJ Heresy, in INFINITE BOUNDARIES: ORDER, DISORDER
AND REORDER IN EARLY MODERN GERMAN CULTURE 336 (Max Reinhart, Ed., Kirksville, Mo:
Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies, 1998).
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secularization of the sovereign - rather it was [is] a
process of sacralization of the state. 33
God's sovereignty was no longer expressed though the universal control
of the Church, yet rather than disappearing, it found its expression in the
belief that monarchs were appointed by the grace of God. In that sense,
"the sovereign body was the mystical corpus of the state in which all the
subordinate parts were present," whereby "just as the Church was the
body of Christ, the state was the body of the sovereign."34
Just like in the name of God, sovereignty-specific structures were
established in the name of state sovereignty, new structures had to be set
up to reinforce states' power. This process perpetuated the belief that
state sovereignty was a superior norm. The following portion of the
paper offers a systematic look at the value of state sovereignty, the
allocation of authority it legitimizes, the enforcement mechanisms it
justifies, and the subsequent world order it creates and reproduces.
Throughout the Westphalian era, the dominant actors were states.
During the first part of the Westphalian era, most of those states were
more or less authoritarian monarchies. 35 In this context, sovereignty
belonged to the state, but the state was personified by its king (or queen):
the
sovereign himself. "L etat, c'est moi," allegedly said Louis the
XIV. After the French arid the American revolutions, the locus of
sovereignty did not change; it still belonged to the state, but
progressively the state was seen as the reflection of the general will of
the people or of the nation. 36 According to Shaw:
Sovereignty until comparatively recently was regarded
as appertaining to a particular individual in a state and
not as an abstract manifestation of the existence and
power of the state - the sovereign was a definable
person to whom allegiance was due.
This
personalization was gradually replaced by the abstract
concept of the state, but the basic mystique remained. "37

33.

Kahn, supra note 8, at 264.

34.

See Louis Marin, PORTRAIT OF THE KING 9-13 (Martha Houle, trans., Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press 1988), quoted in Kahn, supra note 8, at 268.
35.
There is a difference of course, for example, between the absolute monarchy of France and
the parliamentary monarchy of England.
36.
See, for example, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL (1762).
37.
Malcolm N Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 1(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997).
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In this case while the internal structure of power was affected, there were
no fundamental alterations of the system.
Within the context of the belief in states' sovereignty, there is a
horizontal allocation of authority.38 In this system there is no "universal
jurisdiction" of any kind, but rather a juxtaposition of independent
territorial jurisdictions. The mechanisms established to protect and
reproduce this allocation of authority are as follows: internally, sovereign
states ensure the effective control of the government over their
population39 by endowing the government with the legitimate use of
force. Alongside the use of force, less coercive methods are used to
ensure national cohesion: various means ranging from the use of a
common language, legal system, education, infrastructure, etc. foster the
sense of a national identity and thus the legitimacy of a "social contract"
within the nation.
Externally this system relies on the use of force as an essential
mechanism of enforcement; force between states is legitimate to prevent
any attempt of unwanted interference by another. Force toward non-state
actors is also always legitimate to strengthen the power of the very
system. Just like Christendom legitimized conquest in the name of God,
the European state system legitimized the conquest of non-state actors in
the name of the inherent superiority of state sovereignty reserved for
civilized nations. 40 Force was also acceptable when originating from
powerful states and exercised upon weaker ones if those weaker states at
any point menaced the status quo. Krassner identifies 198 cases of
intervention to change domestic regimes between 1555 and 2000. 41
Unlike the previous era, the Westphalian system developed an
increasingly sophisticated legal system regulating the relations between
states. The positivist influence on the development of international law
served to protect states' interests, and in many cases to legitimize their
conduct. For example, "states carried on wars and wars profited the
successful states materially as well as in 'psychic income' whence the
centrality of war and the so called laws of war to internationallaw."42 In
that sense, law legitimized, for example, self-defense as a right.
3S.
See, among others, Hedley Bull, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN
WORLD POLITICS (NY: Columbia University Press, 2(02).
39.
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Art. I , Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat
3097: The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined temtory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations
with the other states.
40.
Sarooshi, supra note 4, at IllS.
41.
Krassner, supra note 7, at 1079.
42.
lochnick and Nornand, supra note 23, at 49,95.
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Self-defense ensured the protection of the entire system and its very
survival. By practice or by treaties, the law of nations, or international
law was built on the common understanding by dominant powers of
sovereignty and its institutional consequences. On this point, Kahn
quoting (with alarm) Carl Schmitt is particularly relevant:

Schmitt is right, however, to see that the same sovereign
po we r that is the source of law is the source of war. The
more a community understands itself as apolitical
people, the more it will find an ultimate meaning in that
identity. It will protect that identity even at the cost of
great sacrifice. In short every war looks like a war of
self-defense to those who pursue it.43
As a result, there has been a progressive fusion of naturalist and
positivist approaches of international law, whereby the naturalist
perspective held the notion that state sovereignty carried with it universal
validity, the very existence of which justified explicit regulations to
protect it. This was actually reinforced by the concept of popular
sovereignty that emerged after the American and French Revolutions.
By transferring internal sovereignty from the state apparatus to the
people, to the nation, or to individuals believed to have inalienable
(natural) rights, the very concept of sovereignty became untouchable; as
universally true as human rights themselves. Or, as Kahn puts it:

The achievement of the modern politics of popular
sovereignty was to link the organic unity of the Church
to the enlightenment belief in reason. [... J This synthesis
gave us a poweiful experience of meaning along with the
capacity to aspire for justice; literally a national Church
of liberalism. It also gave us a deeply militarized state
that could call upon the ample willingness of its citizens
to sacrifice. It gave us law and war. 44
Once again, this period has been faced with many challenges from
non-dominant powers or individuals excluded from the realm of
legitimacy. However, the period has shown remarkable consistency in
the hegemonic belief in state sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction.
Challenges came from colonized territories, especially after World War
II, but those were soon absorbed in the system of sovereign states.
Challenges have come more recently, in a fairly similar fashion to what
43.
44.

Kahn, supra note 8, at 263.
Kahn, supra note 8, at 282.
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occurred in the Middle Ages with the merchant class, from transnational
economic actors, especially transnational corporations. This concern is
addressed in much of the current literature on globalization and
sovereignty.45 Challenges are also coming from other non-state actors:
the neo humanists possibly represented by non-governmental
organizations and a growing international civil society.46 Challenges also
arise from more dangerous groups, possibly the "neo- heretics" of our
time: terrorists and organized criminal groups.

PART II
This paper will now argue that this mostly consensual period among
dominant powers has now reached an end. We are witnessing a much
talked about crisis of the "Western alliance."47 I argue that the current
contrasting perspectives on sovereignty offer enlightening debate. This
crisis is not completely unexpected, especially when examining
US-Franco relations prior to and following wwn. However, the end of
the Cold War has marked a much deeper schism, and I agree with Smith
that it has "raised the possibility that the European Union and the United
States face a context of much more fundamental risk and uncertainty."48
Since WWII, there have been many periods of tension and disagreement
between France and the United States: the uneasy relationship between
DeGaulle and the United States, French withdrawal from the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, French anti-American sentiments during
the Vietnam war, many demonstrations in France over then Vice
President George Bush's statement that the U.S. was the leader of the
free world, and the refusal of the French government to President
Ronald Reagan's plan of overflight on the way to bomb Libya are just a
few of the marks of a troubled relationship. However, throughout the
Cold War, the Western alliance (including the sometimes reluctant
France) remained fairly intact in proposing an anti-communist front. The
end of the Cold War and the promise of a new world order led to a
shifting and repositioning of policies. Since then, we have seen an
increasingly pronounced contrast between the United States and the
European Union (with the exception of the United Kingdom) and
45.
See for example David Strang, From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History
Analysis of Global Decolonization 1870-1987, 846 AM. Soc. REv. (1990).
46.
See, for example,. RESTRUCfURING WORLD POLfnCS: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, NElWORKS AND NORMS (Sanjeev Khagram, Kathryn Sikkick & James Riker, Eds.,
University of Minnesota Press 2002).
47.
See, for example, Robert Kagan, OF PARADISE AND POWER; AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE
NEW WORLD ORDER (New York: Knopf: 2003).
48.
Michael Smith Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the US and World Order
41 INT'L POL. 95-112 (2004).
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especially with France over policy, culminating with the disagreement
over the conflict with Iraq. As explained by Smith:
The accumulation of a wide range of disputes ... [has]
created a situation in which both internally and
externally the Europeans and the Americans base
institutional behavior on the assumption of difference
rather than on the assumption of convergence. 49
Therefore, it is important at this point, to examine in succession the
American and the French perspectives on sovereignty, the system of
meaning they each assign to this concept, and how it shapes policies
especially in regards to the use of force.
I.

THE UNITED STATES' PERSPECTIVE

The United States' perception of sovereignty is articulated around two
prongs: the persistence in hanging on to a classical Westphalian
perspective and the projection of a strong belief in U.S. exceptionalism.
Recent statements and activities of the United States are in accordance
with the classic Westphalian approach described earlier. This approach
places the ultimate and supreme sovereignty in the state and confers on
sovereignty, thus defined an ontological value, while asserting the
positivist nature of international law. The United States seems to operate
on the assumption that its sovereignty can never be trumped by an
international norm to which it does not explicitly adhere. To a great
degree this position has remained unchanged since Chief Justice
Marshall's classic dictum in the Schooner Exchange case in 1812:
the Jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible to no
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it,
deriving validity from an external source would imply a
diminution of sovereignty. 50
So, while the United States enters into international treaties, and
therefore agrees to be bound by certain rules, it consistently holds true to
the fact that international law is always subordinate to the Constitution.
Indeed, the "Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that just as with
[c]ongressional statutes, treaties must be consistent with the
49.

[d. at 101.

50.

Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
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Constitution."51 In so far as it is grounded in treaties, international law
would thus seem securely subordinate to the Constitution and the powers
invested in the Federal government. Indeed, the United States often
pleads to internal legal authorities to mitigate, or refute, its international
obligations. 52 The State, ultimately sovereign (knowing no superior
power), therefore, can only rely on itself for matters of security. It is
commonplace that "major concerns include [ ... J in international affairs,
avoiding exogenous constraints on sovereign prerogative, especially in
the area of national security."53
Undeniably the United States'
perspective is anchored in the realist belief in an anarchic world system. 54
And while the United States was instrumental in proposing a jus ad
bellum that would limit the use of force (Briand Kellogg pact of 1928,
United Nations Charter), it never suggested unconditionally forgoing the
use of force in all circumstances. Self-defense is central in the U.N.
Charter and is an established "inherent"55 right, and subsequently a
corollary to statehood. While it is often read that the U.N. Charter
abolished the use of force as a tool of policy, the Charter also has to be
read as merely redefining the limits in which war is legal or legitimate
and as reasserting the use of force as the exclusive prerogative of states.
The Charter, in this light, institutionalized a "sovereignty centered
collective security."56
The United States' position on sovereignty, very well presented by
Rabkin, is that it "serves as a legitimizing notion for a foreign policy
based essentially on a unilateral - some would say insular - definition of
national action and responsibility."57
This conception of state
sovereignty as the ultimate locus of authority, to which any international
legislation is relegated to an inferior status, legitimates to an American
audience the political reasons for the non-ratification of treaties like the
Kyoto Protocol, the refusal to participate in the International Criminal
Court. It also legitimates breaching international law and the use of
unilateral military action. All of these actions are presented as policies
enacted as a prerogative of sovereignty as well as a way to preserve this
51.
Jeremy Rabkin War, lntematioool Law, and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the
Game in a New Century, 5 CHI. J.INT'L L. 474 (2005).
52.
James C. Hathaway, America Defender of Democratic Legitimacy 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121,
132 (2001).
53.
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty 55 STAN.
L. REv. 1785 (2003).
54.
See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (New York:
Random House, 1979).
55.
UN Charter, art. 51 (1945).
56.
Mariano-Florentino Cuellar. Reflections on Sovereignty and Collective Security,
40 STAN. J.INT'L L., No. 211 (Summer 2004).
57.
Rabkin, supra note 51, at 444.
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sovereignty, thus defined and often portrayed as threatened by
international law. The validation of several international norms and
institutions "would interfere with the traditional notion that sovereign
statehood carries with it the responsibility for defining and maintaining
the legal order within the territorial boundaries of the nation state."58
Alongside the classical definition of sovereignty and the realist
perspective on world order, needs to be added what is often called
"American exceptional ism" or "the sense that the US has a special moral
status and mission [that has] resulted in an intensive engagement by the
US in Foreign Affairs predicated on a belief that America has a unique
mission to lead the world."59 American exceptionalism contributes to the
belief that the United States can be exempted from the rules it promotes.
In this framework, the possibility of unilateral use of force is not only
legitimized as an act of defense of sovereignty, but as the realization of a
mission to protect the world order by spreading democracy. This is not
very different from the Christianization of the Middle Ages, or the
civilizing mission of the classical Westphalian period. Radon notes that
"[s]overeignty in the United States is nearly synonymous with the notion
of American democracy," to the extent that, "[i]n effect it has become an
emotional flag."60 On this point, Kagan is accurate in remarking that "the
only stable and successful international order Americans can imagine is
one that has the United States at its center. Nor can the Americans
conceive of an international order that is not defended by power, and
specifically American Power."61 Kagan echoes the official position of
the United States expressed by Ambassador Richard Hass, former
director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State:
Sovereignty has been the source of stability for more
than two centuries [. .. J It has also provided a stable
framework within which representative governments and
market economies could merge in many nations. At the
beginning of the 21st century, sovereignty remains an

58.
Rabkin's position summarized in John R. Worth. Globalization and the Myth of Absolute
National Sovereignty: Reconsidering the "un-signing" of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of
Senator Bricker, 79lND. L.J. 245 (2004).
59.
Hathaway, supra note 52.
60.
Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion. not a Concept 40 STAN. J. !NT'L L. 195,
202 (2004).
61.
Robert Kagan, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORW
ORDER 94 (New York: Knopf200J).
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essential foundation
prosperity. 62

II.

for

peace,

democracy,

and

THE FRENCH PERSPECTIVE IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT

By contrast, the Europeans are moving away from traditional perceptions
of sovereignty and replacing it with notions of pooled or perforated
sovereignty; similarly defined by Abram and Antonia Chayes as the
"new" sovereignty or the right and capacity to participate in international
institutions. 63 This new version of sovereignty proposed (if not fully
realized) by France and the other Europeans, means that "states that are
members of the European Union have broken sharply with the tradition
of state sovereignty. Sovereignty is pooled in the sense that, in many
areas, states' legal authority over internal and external affairs are
transferred to the community as a whole, authorizing action, through
procedures not involving state vetoes."64 The question is whether or not
this development is perceived in Europe as an abandonment of
sovereignty, a weakening of the state and its functions, or as a truly new
definition and conceptualization favorable to the interests of the state and
its citizens. While there is undoubtedly some political friction over that
question,65 French constitutional practice suggests that the
conceptualization of sovereignty is not only new in name alone. Indeed,
reviewing the decisions made by the Conseil Constitutionel, Professor
Combacau confirms that "international law and French law are
essentially compatible and that international law is by nature not contrary
to French sovereignty."66 The French have adopted a monist approach to
international law, unlike the increasingly dualistic approach of the United
States.
Furthermore, Comabacau's reading of perspectives on sovereignty as it
appears in constitutional practice argues that sovereignty remains intact
even when there is a transfer of competence (for example to the
European Community). In that sense there are no limitations of

62.
Richard N. Haas, President, Council on Foreign Relations, Sovereignty, Existing Rights,
Evolving Responsibilities, Remarks at the School of Foreign Service and the Morganthau Center for
International Studies, Georgetown University (January 14,2003), available at,
http://www.georgetown.edu/sfsldocumentslhaas_sovereignty_20030114.pdf.
63.
Abram and Antonia Chayes, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
64.
Keohane, supra note 1, at 312.
65.
France and the Netherlands voted 'no' to the European Constitution.
n n'existe pas dans Ie droit fran<;ais de domaine qui ne puisse etre regis concurrernment par
66.
des regles internationales et cela n'est pas juge contraire a la souverainete de la France. (translation
is that of the author).
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sovereignty: the transfer of competence is in itself an exercise of full
sovereignty.
In this Comabacau agrees with Slaughter that:

however paradoxical it sounds, the measurement of a
state's capacity to act as an independent unit within the
international system-the condition that sovereignty
purports both to grant and describe- depends on the
breadth and depth of its links to other states. 67

As a result of this practice, the benefits of division of competence in a
mutually accepted framework are apparent. By replacing self-help by a
normative framework the Europeans have lessened the risk of inter-state
wars and offer a viable alternative to the violent world order that is
seemingly perpetuated by the United States. In that sense, the Europeans
have adopted what Ruggie 68 calls, a multi "perspectival" view and are,
thus, promoting what Smith calls "civilian values," by offering a "quite
distinctive range of normative concerns, of domestic political
considerations and linkages between 'hard' and 'soft' security."69 By
opposition to the United States' warrior-type70 model of self-help and
exceptionalism that can only survive under the Westphalian system that
legitimates the use of force, even unilateral, to protect sovereignty, we
can see the sketch of a new model of state sovereignty based not on
exclusive territorial jurisdiction, but rather a locus of jurisdiction that
allows transfers of competence, based on multilateralism and on
overlapping allocations of authority.

TIl. ANALYSIS, STAKES AND CONFRONTAnON
The questions to ask, and hopefully to answer, at this point are multifold.
Is the French/European model viable or is it in Rabkin's term "an act of
foolish submission?"71 Quite the contrary, I believe that the model
advocated by the French government is the expression of a belief that
new challenges of security or otherwise can be better met by a new
model than by an old one. Professor Rabkin reminds us of WWII and
that "if all people were as submissive as the Dutch or the French proved
to be, we might have universal peace - or we might have universal
67.
Anne Marie Slaughter Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order
40 STAN. J.INT'L L 283,286 (2004).
Ruggie, supra note 16.
68.
69.
Smith, supra note 48, at lOt.
70.
[d. at 108.
71.
Rabkin, supra note 51.
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tyranny."72 This statement, echoed widely in the United States,
presupposes that attempts at negotiated peace and multilateralism amount
to a relinquishing of sovereignty and can only lead to tyranny. It is
important to refute this argument, as it is replete with contradictions.
The period preceding WWII was that of classical sovereignty, and ultra
nationalism that ultimately lead to war. By contrast, since WWII the
European pooling of sovereignty (starting with France and Germany) has
now eradicated the risk of an intra state war in Western Europe. Instead
of instating tyranny, democracy has been strengthened.
The second issue to resolve is if the French! European model is foolish or
actually viable and potentially successful. Additionally, can it co-exist
with the American paradigm? In other words, what are the tangible
stakes of what is otherwise an interesting but purely theoretical debate?
Is it more than the continuation of a Franco - American competition for
"moral superiority?" Absolutely. The final goal of this paper is to argue
that contrasting perspectives on sovereignty set the stage for a much
broader reaching confrontation, the outcome of which could drastically
alter the economic and political stability of both countries.
For the most part, the French and European paradigm of pooled
sovereignty appears to be a success. Europe is a formidable economic
powerhouse of 25 countries that boasts an $11 trillion dollar economy,
455 million people, and a currency that is slowly supplanting the United
States dollar in world reserves. 73 Meanwhile, Europe has, once again for
the most part, managed to acquire leadership in key economic sectors
while preserving the basic tenets of a functioning welfare system of
allocating significant budget outlays for social services and reining in
defense expenditures. 74 Meanwhile, the United States economic model,
while producing superior results in terms of Gross Domestic Product,15
cannot hide embarrassing rankings in terms of people living in poverty,
infant mortality, and lack of health care and education. 76 Contrary to
Kagan's view that France's policies, like that of other Europeans "[are]
72.
Id.
73.
See for example CIA World factbook figures available at
https://www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-factbooklindex.hunl(lastvisitedFeb.IS. 200S),
Menzie Chinn &Jeffrey Frankel, Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as Leading
Inte17Ultional Reserve Currency?, available at,
http://wage.wisc.edulpublications/working-papers/index.aspx.
74.
See for example, lohan Lembke, COMPETITION FOR TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP:
EU POLICY FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002).
See for example Stein Kuhnle, Survival of the European Welfare State, available at,
75.
http://www.arena.uio.no/pu blicati ~ns/working-papers 1999.
76.
See for example Quality of Life in the United States - How we stack up, available at,
http://www.dailykos.comlstoryonly/2005/Sn/20486/49640.
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to be seen as a rationalization of the essential weakness of the European
power,"77 it can easily be asserted that French and European policies
have established a very strong power.
Furthermore, what seems to be more relevant to this analysis is the
normative power that the European paradigm is gathering. As Ryan
Goodman and Derek Jinks convincingly argue, the European ideology is
spreading though a constructivist approach.
Through processes of social learning and persuasion, "actors" internalize
new norms and rules of appropriate behavior and redefine their interest
and identities accordingly.78
If the European version prevails, then "becoming or being a sovereign
state would mean the participation of as many government officials as
possible in plurilateral, regional and global government networks."79 In
the words of Smith: "the EU offers an essentially different approach to
world leadership, emphasizing the development of negotiated order and
the mobilization of normative power."80
The European approach creates significant consequences for the United
States. Paul Kahn insists on the growing attraction of the European
model: "For many around the world, the question is how to become more
like the Europeans, which means less like the Americans."81 This
ideological loss for the United States could also precipitate an economic
decline. For example, in one of his visits to Latin America, President
Bush was quite remarkable in his inability to convince Argentina and
other Latin American countries, which depend largely on the United
States, to enter into certain trade agreements.82 This failure should be
noted as much more than a simple hurdle in an otherwise privileged
relationship. It also takes place in the broader current of Latin America
moving away from United States control. Of course, one cannot evade
the topic of Iraq and how United States' use of force without broad
multilateral support is failing to bring the announced results, while
seriously shredding the moral legitimacy of the American model.

77.
Kagan, supra note 47.
78.
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 53.
79.
Slaughter, supra note 67, at 325.
80.
Smith, supra note 48, at 104.
8!.
Kahn, supra note 8, at 264.
No Free Trade Agreement at Summit, MAR DEL PLATA, Argentina, Nov. 6, 2005.,
82.
available at, http://www.cbsnews.com!storiesl2005/l1l-6/worldlmain 1015872.shtml.
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This being said, is it feasible for the United States to adhere to a
European concept of pooled sovereignty and agree to greater
participation in international norms, treaties, and institutions (from
Kyoto, to CEDAW, to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to the
ICC, etc.)? It would partly mean, following Krieger's advice, that the
United States:
should free itself from the mentality about strategic
power that sees only brute force and the threat of force
as the guarantor of the international order. It should
move past the mindset (shared by Kagan) that views the
Europeans alternatives of diplomacy, appeals to
international law, and consensus driven policies as little
more than unseeingly squeamishness about the use of
force. 83

This would require a complete shift not only of foreign policy, but of
domestic economic polices. Indeed, most of American productivity
relies on military spending.B4 It implies the need to justify an
astronomical defense budget85 required by the willingness to use force
more than law, and hard power more than soft power to conduct foreign
affairs. 86 Abandoning the classical Westphalian concept of sovereignty
linked, as aforementioned, to the ability to use force unilaterally if
required, would force a complete reconfiguration of the United States
economy, the details of which obviously go beyond the scope of this
paper. Kahn warns that "when contemporary scholars or leaders declare
that sovereignty is no longer an appropriate ideal [... J they are proposing
to United States a change as significant as a the Reformation was in the
Christian experience. "87

IV.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, it can be asserted that it still remains more feasible for the
United States to weaken the European model and/or construction and to
influence each European country individually to readopt a more
nationalistic perspective to their identity. If this is plausible, then many
83.

Joel Krieger, GLOBALIZATION AND STATE POWER: WHO WINS WHEN AMERJCA RULES 55

(NY: Pearson Longamn, 2005).

84.
James M. Cypher, The Iron Triangle: the New Military Build up Dollars and Sense
magazine, January/February 2002 available at, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com.
85.
See FY 2007 Budget Proposal: Agency-by Agency Breakdown, available at,
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-srvIpoli tics/interacti ves/budget07/agencies .htmt.
86.
Pascal Boniface, LA FRANCE CONTRE L'EMPIRE 15 (paris: Robert Laffont, 2003).
87.
Khan, supra note 8, at 277.
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recent and more than likely upcoming confrontations between France
and the United States will not merely be diplomatic differences resulting
from different styles. For example, in this light, Rumsfeld's statement of
"old Europe v. new Europe"88 was far from being a mere boorish
blunder, but more a deliberate attempt at creating dissent within the
continent. Many such events can be analyzed in this framework, and
while labeling this trend the new cold war may be going too far,89 it,
nonetheless, appears to be an increasingly heated posturing.

88.
Rumsfeld Repeats "Old Europe" Comments 11.06.2003, available at,
http:/www.dw-wprld.deldw/articlelO..890806.html.
89.
Andrew 0' Hehir. Welcome to the New Cold War, available at,
http://dir.salon.com!storylbooks/feature/2004/11/15/europelindex.html.
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